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Abstract 
 
We examine theoretically and empirically the relationship between access regulation, financial 
structure and investment decisions in network industries, analyzing if financial variables can be 
used as a strategic device to influence the regulator’s price setting decisions. Using a panel of 
15 EU Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) over the period 1994-2005, we first 
investigate the determinants of regulated prices (both wholesale and retail), firm financial 
structure and investment, and then test the relationship between leverage, regulated charges and 
firm’s investment. However, our model suggests that if leverage influences the regulated access 
charges, then it will also impact competition in the downstream segment. Therefore, we also 
investigate the impact of the PTO’s leverage on market competition. Our results show that 
leverage positively affects regulated rates, as well as the PTOs’ investment rate, as predicted by 
Spiegel and Spulber (1994). Moreover, higher leverage also leads to higher access charges and 
an increase in leverage is followed by a decrease in the number of competitors and by an 
increase of the incumbent’s market share. This suggests that the strategic use of debt to 
discipline the regulator’s lack of commitment within a vertically integrated network industry 
may somewhat impair or delay competition in the retail segment, but has a favorable 
counterpart in mitigating the underinvestment problem. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Infrastructure investments are crucial in network industries because of their influence on prices and 
quantities in the long run, and because their delay generates enormous welfare costs.1  Regulation 
affects investment decisions, especially when pro-competitive regulatory regimes are introduced.2 
An instrument that regulators typically adopt to enhance competition in the potentially competitive 
segments of a market is the obligation to provide access “at fair and non-discriminatory 
conditions” to the existing network, which is typically operated and maintained by an incumbent 
firm. Access (or wholesale) regulation plays a fundamental role in vertically integrated markets, 
where the network is the essential facility for the provision of final services and access is vital to 
encourage and sustain entry in the competitive segment of the market.  
However, investment decisions are affected not only by regulation but also by firms’ 
financial stability. When the financial position of a regulated firm deteriorates, the risk of financial 
distress also increases and this compromises the financeability of investments as the managers 
become more concerned with the firm’s financial solvency than with infrastructure expansion.3 
This paper analyses the relationship between access regulation, financial structure and 
investment decisions in a vertically integrated industry, the telecommunications industry, and 
empirical investigates if financial variables can be used as a strategic device to influence the 
regulator’s price setting decisions, competition in the retail segment, and incumbents’ investment 
decisions. 
Modern telecommunications are an interesting case to study because access regulation has 
became the key feature of the regulatory framework since the inception of market liberalization and 
investment in new communication infrastructures – such as Next Generation Networks (NGNs) that 
will provide high-speed connection and broadband and ultra broadband services in the next future – 
is believed to be a significant contributor to economic growth.4  
                                                 
1 See Guthrie (2006), Hausman (1997) and Kessides (2004).  
2 See, for example, Alesina et al. (2005) who find a positive relationship between deregulatory reforms of product 
markets and investment. In particular, entry liberalization plays an important role to spur investment. 
3 Recently, a joint study of the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the HM Treasury (DTI-HM, 2004) has 
expressed a concern about the “dash for debt” or “flight of equity” of UK utilities, including telecom incumbent British 
Telecom. 
4 NGNs will allow new ICT services to be delivered in bundle with voice services and broadband connection, and will 
require massive sunk investments in optical fibre connections. These investments are supposed to significantly 
contribute to the economic growth. Röller and Waverman (2001), using data from 21 OECD countries over a 20-year 
period, show that an increase of 10% in the broadband adoption rate leads on average to an increase of 2.8% of GDP 
growth. Koutroumpis (2009) shows that the average impact of broadband infrastructure on GDP is 0.63% (for the EU-
15, in the period 2002-2007), that is, 16.92% of total growth in this period. Greenstein and McDevitt (2009) show that 
broadband accounted for $28 billion of US GDP in 2006, and they estimate that $20 to $22 billion was associated with 
household use. 
  2
Recent debate on investment in telecoms infrastructure is mostly focussed on the impact of 
access regulation.5 We depart from existing studies because we introduce the capital structure 
decisions of the regulated incumbents in the interplay between access regulation and investment.   
The financial exposition of Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) has increased to 
levels never seen in the last decades, and has become the hot issue in the industry, because of the 
PTOs’ financial gearing. At the end of 2005, the Financial Times wrote: “the telecommunications 
sector is in a particularly precarious position, with a number of companies facing the threat of being 
downgraded to junk status. In this sector, 50 per cent of the companies have negative outlooks or 
are on credit watch with negative implications”6. This situation has even worsened after 2005: at the 
end of 2008, the net debt position of Deutsche Telekom was equal to 41 billion of euros, France 
Telecom 36 billion of euros, Telecom Italia 34 billion of euros, British Telecom 11 billions and, at 
the top, Telefonica de Espana with 45 billion of euros! In addition, new bonds are going to be 
issued in the next years (2010-2011) to finance European telecoms operators’ activities for an 
expected value of 45 billion of euros.  
Theoretical models developed by Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Spiegel (1994 and 1996) 
identify the capital structure as a strategic mechanism that affects the regulator – regulated firm 
interaction, when regulators cannot commit not to review ex post the regulated charges. This lack of 
commitment typically leads to an underinvestment problem. High debt levels can make regulators 
concerned with the financial stability of the incumbent operator and reluctant to reduce regulated 
rates, thus shielding the firm against ex post regulatory opportunism. Therefore, the choice of the 
debt level can be viewed as an instrument that partially limits the underinvestment problem 
originating from the time inconsistency of the regulatory intervention.7 Empirical evidence by 
Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi and Spiegel (2008) shows, for a large panel of EU utilities, that higher 
leverage leads to higher retail rates, provided firms are subject to an independent regulator and 
privately controlled. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Waverman et al. (2007) and Grajek and Röller (2009) find a discouraging role of wholesale 
regulation (in the form of local loop unbundling) on infrastructure investment by both incumbents and entrants in fixed-
line telecommunications. For a recent survey on the relationship between regulation and investment in telecoms, see 
Cambini and Jiang (2009). 
6 Cited in “European company debt at five-year high”, by D. Oakley, The Financial Times, November 3rd, 2006. 
7 In practice, regulators do take the cost of debt into account when they set retail and wholesale charges. The most 
widely used price mechanisms in Europe and US – e.g. the rate of return or the price cap at retail level and the cost-
based access charge or network caps at wholesale level - refer to the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as the 
interest rate to evaluate the allowed capital expenditures. Thus, as long as indebtedness affects the way a regulated tariff 
is computed and, at the same time, determines how investment outlays are financed, the incentives for a strategic use of 
debt may ultimately be stronger than for a literal application of the pricing mechanism.  
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In this paper, we analyze both theoretically and empirically the strategic role of leverage and 
its impact on regulated (retail but also wholesale) rates and firm’s investment decisions. We first 
develop a stylized model that combines the Spiegel (1994)’s model of capital structure choices in a 
regulated environment with the Laffont and Tirole (1994)’ model that studies the optimal social 
choice of wholesale rate in a vertically related industry. From our simplified model, we derive 
empirical predictions that we test using firm level data for a panel of 15 EU PTOs and country level 
regulated rates over the period 1994-2005. We first analyze the determinants of wholesale and retail 
prices, of firm leverage and firm fixed capital investment. We then test the relationship between 
capital structure and regulated - both retail and wholesale – charges. Since the incumbent operator is 
vertically integrated, the access charge affects the alternative operators’ marginal cost for the 
provision of retail services, but not the marginal cost of incumbent firm. Should leverage influence 
regulated access charge, this in turn has an impact also on competition in the retail segment. 
Bearing this in mind, we investigate the relationship between firm leverage and the number of 
competitors in the retail segment and, alternatively, the incumbent’s market share in the retail 
market.  Finally, we investigate the interaction between debt and investment of fixed telecoms 
operators.  
The empirical investigation controls for key features of the institutional context, such as the 
degree of regulatory independence (as in Edwards and Waverman, 2006) and its intensity (as in 
Grajek and Röller, 2009), the intensity of regulation of market entry (as in Alesina et al. 2005), the 
regulatory climate through political variables (as in Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi and Spiegel, 2008) 
and also for firm productivity growth as a proxy for technological change. We deal with 
endogeneity problems by applying instrumental variable methods that either use institutional and 
political variables to instrument the regulatory environment or framework or employ lags of internal 
right-hand variables (GMM estimator) when dynamic models are estimated. 
This paper has three main contributions. First, we extend Spiegel (1994)’s model and 
provide a simplified theoretical framework to analyze the interplay among capital structure, access 
regulation and investment. Secondly, we investigate whether the PTOs’ capital structure affects 
wholesale charges and, in turn, competition in the retail downstream segment. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the impact of capital structure decision on regulated 
wholesale charges. 8 Thirdly, we provide empirical evidence of the interaction between financial 
and investment decisions in the European telecoms industry. 
                                                 
8 The IO literature has long analyzed the reasons and the economic conditions of ex ante intervention in granting access 
to an essential facility managed by the PTOs. Most of the literature on telecom regulation focuses mainly on the 
definition of optimal price mechanism where asymmetric information is viewed as the most serious problem vexing the 
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Our results show that an increase in leverage positively affects regulated rates, both at the 
retail and at the wholesale level. We also find that increases in leverage have a negative impact on 
competition, but a positive effect on the PTOs’ investment rate. This suggests that the strategic use 
of debt to discipline the regulator’s lack of commitment within a vertically integrated network 
industry may somewhat impair or delay competition in the retail segment, but as favorable 
counterpart in mitigating the underinvestment problem.  
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we present the theoretical framework 
and the empirical predictions. In section 3, we describe the Institutional background on EU 
telecommunication industry and in section 4 the changing pattern of market competition and of 
interconnection rates in Europe.  In section 5 we describe the dataset and the firm level variables. In 
section 6 we present the econometric results. Section 7 summarizes the main results and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and empirical predictions 
One primary goal of regulation is to promote competition and to enhance social welfare 
(Armstrong and Sappington, 2006). A major drawback however is that a conflict between social and 
private interests arises whenever pro-competitive and efficiency enhancing regulatory regimes may 
undermine the firm’s incentives to invest and maintain the infrastructure.9 This tension is typical of 
telecom operators where adequate provision of the service requires large amounts of investment that 
is both irreversible and risky, and uncertainty in the regulatory framework and rules can further 
deprive utilities’ incentives to invest. When regulators cannot commit to long-term regulated prices, 
they may have an incentive to cut prices, once the firm’s investments are sunk, in order to benefit 
consumers at the expenses of the firm’s owners.  
Economic literature has analysed the time-inconsistency problem in regulation, i.e. the so- 
called hold-up problem (Besanko and Spulber, 1992). One strand of the literature has introduced the 
capital structure decision as a potentially useful instrument to restraint regulatory opportunism 
(Spiegel and Spulber, 1994, Spiegel 1994 and 1996).   By allowing the firm to become highly 
leveraged and exposed to financial distress, the regulator will discipline the lack of commitment 
problem, tying his/her own hands not to reduce the regulated retail rates ex-post, and re-establishing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
regulator-PTO relationship (Laffont and Tirole, 2000; Armstrong, 2002; Vogelsang, 2003, among others)  We do not 
find papers that analyze the impact of capital structure decisions on the wholesale rates setting process. 
9 In their book, Laffont and Tirole (2000, p. 7) note that: “There is in general a trade-off between promoting 
competition to increase social welfare once the infrastructure is in place and encouraging ex ante the incumbent to 
invest and maintain the infrastructure”. 
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the firm’s incentives to invest. Debt financing may thus lead to higher regulated prices while at the 
same time encouraging regulated firms to increase their investment rates.  
Following these predictions, Bortolotti, Cambini, Rondi and Spiegel (BCRS, 2008) 
investigate the relationship between the capital structure and the regulated retail prices for a large 
panel of EU utilities in energy, telecommunication, transport and water industries from 1994 and 
2005. They find that i) EU utilities tend to increase their leverage following the introduction of an 
Independent Authority, but only if they are privately-controlled, and ii) higher leverage leads to 
higher regulated rates, i.e. leverage Granger-causes regulated prices (but not vice versa), when firms 
are privately controlled and regulated by an IRA. BCRS (2008), however, do not examine the 
relationship between leverage and investment and, more importantly, the leverage-price relationship 
is analysed only for retail charges. 
In this paper, we depart from existing works in two directions. First, we analyse the 
relationship between capital structure and investment decisions, testing the prediction implicit in 
Spiegel and Spulber (1994)’s model that higher leverage leads to higher investment. Second, we 
extend the analysis to account for the typical vertical structure of telecommunications industry and 
the specific regulatory interventions on wholesale – i.e. access – rates as well as the retail prices. 
This feature introduces an interesting twist in the strategic interaction between the regulator and the 
regulated incumbent firm, because the regulator may choose whether to “tie his own hands” with 
respect to the access price or with respect to the retail charge, or both. The theory is silent about this 
because the original model is designed for a monopolistic utility industry where access to an 
essential facility was not an issue.  In contrast, the market structure of telecom industry in most 
European countries is characterised by an upstream monopolistic network segment and a 
downstream retail segment with a dominant incumbent (usually the PTO) competing with 
alternative new entrant operators. Hence, whether the regulator reacts by adjusting the access or the 
retail charge, or both, will have a consequence for competition in the downstream segment and, in 
turn, for the incumbent’s investment incentives.  
Unfortunately, complicating factors in the telecommunication industry potentially prejudice 
the interpretation of the empirical analysis. First, regulation of access rates is usually more intensive 
than regulation of retail charges because there is much less competition in the upstream segment.  
Second, wholesale rates usually influence retail charges thereby following a similar trend, though, 
in addition, the latter are also affected by competition. Third, the effectiveness and the 
independence of regulators may influence the regulated firm’s investment decisions. We therefore 
have to reconsider the original model’s predictions – i.e. debt leads to higher regulated prices and, 
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at the same time, encourages regulated firms to increase their investment levels - by taking theses 
complicating factors into account. 
In order to derive testable predictions in this complex framework, we develop a stylized 
model in the Appendix that combines the Spiegel (1994)’s model of capital structure choices in a 
regulated environment with the Laffont and Tirole (1994)’ model that studies the optimal social 
choice of wholesale rate in a vertically related industry. The model considers a vertically integrated 
firm operating both in the upstream and downstream segment of an industry. In the upstream 
market, the firm runs a network whose access represents the essential input for the provision of 
retail services. In the downstream market, the incumbent operator competes with a fringe of 
alternative operators.10 Moreover, the alternative operators need access to the existing network for 
providing the final service. The access charge is therefore subject to regulation by a benevolent 
regulator, who is not able to ex ante fully commit in his price setting decisions. Following the 
approach by Spulber (1989), the access charge is set by using a bargaining process between the 
firm, which is interested in maximizing its profit, and the regulator, who is interested in maximizing 
consumers’ surplus. The model, in the same vein of Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Spiegel (1994), 
provides the following results: as far as the regulated charges concern, it results that the higher is 
the debt issued by the firm, the higher is the regulated access charge set by the regulator and in turn 
the higher is the regulated final price. Therefore, there exists a direct relationship between the 
regulated (wholesale and retail) charges and the level of the debt. This is our first set of testable 
prediction. If the level of debt positively affects the wholesale rate, then it will also affect the 
quantity sold in the downstream segment by alternative operators, since their marginal cost for 
providing the final service rises too. On the contrary, the vertically integrated incumbent operator 
will only pay the real marginal cost of the service, which is likely to be lower than the one faced by 
the alternative operators whenever the access charge is not entirely “cost oriented” and firms are 
equally efficient in the downstream segment. Then, the incumbent could use debt not only to 
influence the regulator’s price setting decision, but also to put the rivals at disadvantage. In this 
event, our testable prediction is that the higher is the debt, the lower is market competition. We will 
measure this sort of raising rival cost effect induced by the leverage, using two (absolute and 
relative) measures of the degree of market competition: the number of competitors and the 
evolution of the market share of the incumbent. The reason why the regulators permits that the 
regulated charges raise with the debt, at least up to a threshold level (see equation A6 in the 
                                                 
10 Even though this assumption could seem too strong, it is needed to simplify our analysis without any loss of relevant 
insight. Moreover, with the only exception of UK and Sweden, competition in the telecoms market within our time 
horizon is quite limited, as shown in Section 3. 
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Appendix) , is – as shown by Spiegel and Spulber (1994) - to tie their own hands and reduce their 
ex post opportunism. Insofar as debt can shield the incumbent from ex post opportunism by the 
regulator, debt will also provides the regulated firm with better incentives to reduce the typical 
underinvestment problem. As argued by Spiegel and Spulber (1994, p. 436), debt influences 
investment because “the regulator will permit firms to take on debt only if debt increases the firm’s 
ex ante investment level”. Thus, and this is our third prediction to test, we would expect that the 
higher the debt issued by the firm the higher the investment rate is.  
It is worth noting that so far we have never mentioned neither the quality of the regulatory 
environment nor social welfare objectives that the government in charge might wish to promote, 
although both of these institutional aspects deeply affect the efficacy of the action and the stance of 
the regulator – e.g. pro-firm or pro-consumers, pursuing static or dynamic efficiency. As recently 
emphasized by the literature (Levy and Spiller, 1994; Edwards and Waverman, 2006), the degree of 
regulatory independence (either from the government in charge or from the regulated 
firm/incumbent) enhances the commitment powers of regulators and reduces the uncertainty of 
regulatory interventions, thus playing a key role in utilities’ investment decisions. The relationship 
between regulators and politicians can be especially important in European countries, where 
regulators are appointed by governments and not elected by citizens (Henisz and Zelner, 2001).  
Even if the regulator is formally independent from politicians, in fact, the political orientation of the 
elected government may influence not only the regulator’s agenda, and make it more or less pro-
firm or pro-consumers, but also firm investment and financing decisions, as, typically, stock 
markets favourably react to right-wing governments. Since we recognize the importance of the 
regulatory and political environment, we will control for their impact in the empirical analysis.   
 
3 The telecommunication industry in the EU  
3.1 Institutional background and legislative framework  
In the last twenty years, rapid evolution of telecommunication technology and fast growing demand 
for telecommunications services have led to intense changes in both the market / industry structure 
and the regulatory framework.  Many European countries, following the UK experience of 
structural reforms in the ‘80s, have gradually liberalised the domestic markets and privatised public 
telecommunications operators.11 With very few exceptions, public telecom operators are now 
privately controlled and the retail market is (almost) fully liberalised almost everywhere.  
                                                 
11 The regulatory framework has changed over time following the technological and competitive evolution of 
the industry. Formally, liberalization in the telecommunications market kicked off in the late ‘80s, with the Green Paper 
Access Regulation, Financial Structure and Investment in Vertically Integrated Utilities
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From the start, the key concern of the newly established IRAs was that the design of the 
regulatory framework could guarantee that potential entrants have both access to and 
interconnection with the network, since this crucial asset belonged (and still belongs) to the 
incumbent fixed telecommunication operators. Since 1998, many telecom services have been 
liberalized and deregulated, the most prominent example being the retail services.12 In 2003, also 
telecom services for specific traffic directions - mainly international calls – and specific client 
categories – mainly business users – were gradually deregulated.  However, at the end of 2005, 
price regulation (through a price cap or other forms of tariff approval) of voice services for family 
users was still in place in many EU countries13 and PTOs were (and still are) under tight regulatory 
obligations on wholesale services. In December 2007, the European Commission revised the 
regulatory framework in order to limit ex ante intervention at the retail level, and to focus, instead, 
on access and interconnection services (Recommendation 2007/879/EC). In sum, access and 
interconnection issues are the bulk of regulatory intervention in the telecoms industry. 
 
3.2 Market evolution and interconnection rates in Europe  
 
European Commission reports on the Implementation of European Electronic 
Communication Regulatory Framework (EC, 1998 – 2006) provide useful information about the 
degree and type of competition faced by European incumbent operators in the time span we are 
considering. By the end of 2005, only 7 countries have more than four relevant competing 
operators, i.e. “alternative operators that together with the incumbent, control a combined market 
share of 90%” as defined by the EC reports, and the average market share (in terms of revenues) of 
incumbent operators in EU-15 is 72% in the local segment and 65% in the national segment. 
Moreover, alternative operators tend to concentrate their business on specific segments of the 
market, such as business users, or to restrict their activity to specific services (long distance calls – 
national and international) or geographic areas, thus carrying just a limited impact on the total 
                                                                                                                                                                  
for the Development of the Common Market for telecommunication services and equipment (1987). In the early ‘90s 
the EC issued a number of Directives dealing with the telecoms sector. But the fundamental piece of EC legislation for 
TLC is Directive 96/19, the so-called Full Competition Directive, which opened up the market for voice telephony 
starting from January 1st, 1998 and ruled that every member state should have an Independent Regulatory Authorities 
for telecommunications industry.   
12 Due to these developments, in 2002 the EU Commission issued four Directives (the Framework, the 
Authorization, the Access and the Universal Service Obligation Directive2002/19-22/EC) which set up a new regulatory 
framework and introduced a new approach relying on “ex post” rather than “ex ante” intervention especially at retail 
level (Buigues and Rey, 2004). 
13 In 2006, Denmark, Finland and UK, fully deregulated retail charges while in Italy, France and Spain, price caps 
became gradually less tight. For detailed information, see the OECD report (2006) and Table 10 therein. 
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national market. Therefore, in this period, competition is largely asymmetric and incumbents still 
dominate the retail market.   
Competition among operators is more likely to be based on services rather than on 
alternative infrastructures (EC, 2006; figure 19): at the end of 2005 direct access to alternative 
providers is used only by 7.7% of EU15 subscribers. Alternative proprietary infrastructures are very 
limited and direct access is primarily due to the so called local loop unbundling (LLU), which 
forces alternative operators to spend large (and sunk) amounts of money to install their equipment 
at local exchanges (owned by the incumbent), and to rent only the very last mile (the loop) from the 
incumbent. LLU is supposed to be the appropriate regulatory scheme to stimulate competition 
among operators in the early stages, i.e. when entrants have not yet rolled out alternative 
infrastructures. However, by the end of 2005, only the 8% of total lines were unbundled in 
Germany, 5% in Italy and 2% in France (COCOM, 2006) and even more recently LLU is still 
limitedly used in most EU countries, confirming its complex application (EC, 2007; COCOM, 
2007). Therefore, in our 1998-2005 sample period, telecom utilities compete over the provision of 
telecom services rather than on duplication of alternative facilities, and alternative operators have to 
access to the incumbent’s network at various levels of the multi-layered network structure.14  
Access charges play a key role in the development of the telecom market and identify the 
bulk of the regulatory issues for telecommunications industry (Cave, 1997, Laffont and Tirole, 
2000). Through access to the network, entrants may terminate the call they have originated into the 
existing incumbent network and are allowed to reach customers without having to duplicate the 
infrastructure of their own. For these reasons, one of the main concerns for NRAs is to efficiently 
regulate access rates so as to avoid any potential advantage for the vertically integrated incumbent 
operator and to level the playing field among competitors. In addition, the EU Commission requires 
that interconnection rates be “cost orientated” in order “to encourage efficient entry and a rapid 
development of an open and competitive market” (Directive 97/33/EC, art. 7).  
Alternative operators may access to the incumbent’s fixed network through different 
wholesale services, like local access and  single tandem interconnection (Edwards and Waverman, 
2006). The choice among interconnection modes depends on the amount of network the entrants 
want to use.  Local access is needed when the entrant uses its own infrastructure to reach the local 
exchange nearest the party being called; the alternative operator thus rents only a limited fraction 
                                                 
14 Alternative operators can route users to their network either through a carrier selection system (CS), i.e. user dials a 
prefix on a call-by-call basis, or by carrier pre-selection (CPS), where the user’s calls are routed to the new entrants’ 
network on an automatic basis. These are mainly non-infrastructured modes of entry and they were highly used by 
alternative operators in all Europe. For example, at the end of 2005, CPS was used in Italy by 100% of alternative 
operators, 92% in UK, 67% in France, 87% in Belgium and 40% in Germany (EC, 2006). In recent years, many 
alternative operators have shifted towards more infrastructured modes of entry and CPS and CS lost their importance. 
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(the core distribution network) of the incumbent’s network and creates its own network for 
transporting calls all over the country. If instead the entrant has not invested in proprietary 
infrastructure, a larger fraction of the incumbent’s network must be rented. In this case, single 
tandem interconnection is used to terminate calls anywhere in a metropolitan area. Single tandem 
interconnection was, at least up to 2007, the most widely used entry method in Europe and single 
tandem rates may be, accordingly, viewed as the reference interconnection rates for most European 
countries (see ERG, 2007).15 Revenues from sales of these wholesale services are very high in the 
period we consider, covering approximately from 20% to 25% of PTO’s total revenues.16 
Figure 1 shows the price indexes for the two rates (2005=100).  From 1998 to 2005, the 
interconnection rates halved (single transit even more than halved). The remarkable descent of 
access charges was unquestionably influenced by intense NRAs’ supervision as well as by major 
progress in the information and telecommunication technology, as telecom utilities significantly 
increased their productivity levels in the past decade.  
 
4. The data 
Our dataset comprises firm level variables for 15 publicly traded Public Telecommunication 
Operators (PTOs) from 14 EU countries during the period 1994-2005 (see the list of firms in the 
Appendix A.3). The panel is unbalanced, as firms have from 6 to 12 consecutive observations.  We 
construct our dataset by merging accounting and financial market data from Worldscope with 
several sources in order to obtain: wholesale charges (Eurostat - New Cronos; European 
Commission – DG XIII, Telecommunications Regulatory Package); retail price indexes and fixed 
investment price deflator (Eurostat and OECD); information on the institutional context such as the 
regulatory environment and regulatory independence (Edwards and Waverman, 2006); the extent of 
regulation of market entry (OECD International Regulation database by Conway and Nicoletti, 
2006); and the intensity of specific market regulation (Plaut Index by Zenhausern et al., 2007).  
The theoretical implications of the model focus on three variables, financial indebtedness, 
regulated prices and fixed investment.  
                                                 
15 Double tandem interconnection, the third level of access to the existing network, allows alternative operators that 
only have a single point of interconnection, to enter all of the incumbent’s network and terminate their calls anywhere 
in the network. This access mode is for alternative operators that have not invested in any proprietary infrastructure, and 
was mostly used at the beginning of the liberalization process, i.e. when new operators entered the market. Since 
Double tandem interconnection lost its relevance as market competition increases, (see ERG, 2007), we prefer to focus 
on the mostly used access services.    
16 The importance of wholesale services in terms of traffic, is even higher: in Italy, for example, we observe an average 
of 180 billions of national calls’ minutes per year in the period 1998-2005, and approximately 80 billions of wholesale 
minutes of traffic. 
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To define indebtedness we consider measures that capture the risk of the default.17 Our 
preferred variable is therefore the textbook definition of leverage, i.e. the book value of financial 
debt (both long- and short-term) divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the book value of 
equity. Alternatively, we also construct the total financial debt to total assets ratio (debt-to-assets) 
and the total financial debt to sales, which we use for a robustness checks.   
We estimate our models using both retail and wholesale charges.  Retail prices at the 
individual firm level are not available, therefore we use sectoral retail price indexes, which 
incorporate the changes both in traffic (usage) charges (for local, national and international calls) 
and in monthly fixed fees.  Because the regulators in the newly liberalized market had to enforce 
“tariff rebalancing”, the different components of the typical “telecom bill” ended up following 
opposite trends: ascending over time that of fixed monthly fees and downward that of usage 
charges.  
As for wholesale charges, we use the access rates on the incumbent’s fixed network for local 
level and for single transit that we described with some detail in section 2.2.  
Investment rate is the change in the fixed capital stock. In the econometric analysis we use 
the investment rate calculated as the ratio of gross fixed investment to capital stock at the 
replacement value.18      
Figure 2 shows that, similarly to wholesale rates, also the fixed retail prices substantially 
diminish over this period. As described in Section 2, the decline of retail prices results from 
regulatory intervention, competition pressure as well as technological change.  By construction, the 
impact of technological progress, and the fast-growing productivity of telecom operators has 
influenced regulatory rates (both retail and wholesale) through the (price and network) cap 
mechanism.  
Labour Productivity and the Total factor Productivity index account for increasing 
efficiency at the firm level. The former is the ratio between real sales revenues and the number of 
employees, the latter we obtain from estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function.19 Figures 3a 
                                                 
17 See Rajan and Zingales (1995) for a discussion of alternative leverage measures.  
18 The accounting data from Worldscope only include historic cost valuations of fixed assets, which usually bear little 
relation to current replacement cost of long-lived fixed capital assets. Hence, we calculate the replacement cost of the 
capital stock using the perpetual inventory formula: pt+1Kt+1 = ptKt(1-δ)(pt+1/pt) + pt+1It+1, where pt is the country-specific 
implicit price deflator for gross capital formation in period t sourced by the OECD, Kt is the fixed capital stock in period 
t, It is the investment flow in period t, and δ is the depreciation rate. For the depreciation rates, we use the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis estimates as reported in “Rates of Depreciation, Service Lives, Declining Balance Rates, and 
Hulten-Wykoff Categories” and applied a constant rate of 8% for telecommunications.  
19 To obtain an index of total factor productivity from estimating a Cobb-Douglas gross output production 
function of the form: Yit = AKitαLitβXitγ where Y is output, A is a Hicks-neutral productivity shift parameter, K is capital 
output, L is labour, X is intermediate inputs, α, β, γ are the elasticities of output with respect to the relevant factor.  We 
estimated the production function in log-linear form: yit= ait + αkit+ β lit+ γxit + μt, where variables in lower case are 
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and 3b show the average Labour Productivity and the average TFP Index for the fifteen PTOs in our 
sample. The upward trend of labour productivity is weak until 2001, even slowing down between 
1999 and 2001, and then accelerates between 2001 and 2004. The pattern of the TFP index is 
similar, with a lower peak in 1998, a slowdown until 2001 and then a fast increasing trend up to 
2005. It is worth noting that both TFP and labour productivity nearly doubled while the regulated 
rates nearly halved over the period, thus confirming that technological progress played a key role in 
this evolution.  
Figure 4 show the average financial leverage from 1994 to 2005. The trend is quite steep, it 
is steadily increasing up to 2000 and it reverts and drops in 2003, and thereafter resumes its growth. 
Finally, in Figure 5 we report the average investment rates. The pattern is very irregular from 1995 
to 1999, even collapsing in 1996 and 1997 just before the liberalization EU directives. Investments 
increase more smoothly from 1999 to 2003 and then again they decline.     
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables we use in the econometric analysis.   
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
Our goal is to investigate, for the 15 European PTOs in the dataset, the relationship between capital 
structure, investment and regulatory outcomes over the period from 1995-2005. As discussed in 
Section 2, complicating factors in the telecommunications industry and in the regulatory 
environment have to be considered, and controlled for, in order to interpret the results.  Our 
empirical strategy thus starts with the analyses of the determinants of wholesale and retail rates, of 
PTOs’ investment and leverage, and continues with the analysis of the dynamic interactions 
between leverage and investment, regulated rates and market competition (as proxied by the number 
of competitors in the retail segment and by the market share of the incumbent in the national retail 
market).  For this purpose, we will perform Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) causality tests, which 
allow us to evaluate whether higher leverage leads to higher prices and to weaker (or tougher) 
competition, or viceversa.20      
                                                                                                                                                                  
logs and μt is a year dummy.  We used instrumental variables (2SLS) to estimate the log-linearized production function 
to take account of the simultaneity between input choices and productivity shocks. Lagged values of k, l, x, and the firm 
market share were used as instruments. We included the market share because over the last decade incumbent PTOs 
began to underuse their fixed network productive capacity due to a fast increase in intra-modal competition (increase in 
the number of fixed telephony competitors at the retail level) and in inter-modal competition (increase in the adoption 
of mobile telephony). The residual ait can be interpreted as TFP (see Van Biesenbroeck, 2007, for a recent survey), and 
we used it to construct the TFP index and Figure 3b.  
20 Granger causality tests have been increasingly employed in the recent regulation literature. For example, Alesina et 
al. (2005) study the causal relationship between the intensity of product market regulation and investments in 21 OECD 
countries; Edwards and Waverman  (2006) test the relation between interconnection rates and regulatory independence 
in the EU-15 member states from 1997 to 2003; Gasmi, Noumba and Recuero Virto (2006) study the impact of political 
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5.1 Regulated Rates, Fixed Investment and Leverage in EU PTOs 
5.1.1 Regulated Rates 
The econometric analysis of the determinants of regulated rates is reported in Table 2. We 
estimate a simple specification where wholesale charges - Local and Single transit rates – and the 
Retail price index are regressed on the PTO’s total factor productivity index – lagged one year -, on 
firm fixed effects and on a country-sector specific index that captures “regulatory independence” of 
telecom NRAs from government influence.  By including an index of regulatory independence we 
attempt to control for the complexity, and the heterogeneity, of the regulatory environment.  NRAs 
typically oversee interactions between the vertically integrated incumbent and entrant firms, and 
their decisions affect the PTOs’, the alternative operators’ and consumers’ surpluses. Not 
surprisingly, governments may try to influence the NRA so as to induce decisions that are in 
contrast with “effective regulation” and, rather, consistent with their own political agenda, 
alternatively favouring entrants, consumers or the PTO. To prevent political interference in the 
decisions of the NRA and to make NRA as “independent” as possible from the government, 
institutional arrangements are set up (and even prompted by the European Commission) and we 
control for the degree of independence of the NRA by including the EURI index (European Union 
Regulatory Institutions) by Edwards and Waverman (2006). The index is based on information on 
formal institutional elements in the regulation of telecommunications such as the powers, the 
financing, the accountability, the tenure and the appointment of the regulator. It ranges from 0 (low 
independence) to 1 (high independence). As more independent NRAs are predicted to be more able 
to commit to “effective regulation”, we expect, similarly to Edwards and Waverman (2006), that the 
EURI index will enter our regression with a negative coefficient, that is the more independent the 
NRA the lower the regulated rate.  
Total factor productivity is included to test whether regulated rates are set consistently with 
economic criteria, that is with the typical “cost-orientation obligation”, as requested by the EU’s 
interconnection directives. In the absence of production and technical data to estimates “costs”, as 
described in Section 2, we estimated a Cobb-Douglas gross output production function and then 
constructed an index of total factor productivity from (see Section 2).  Total factor productivity is 
expected to capture not only the impact of declining “production costs”, but also technological 
                                                                                                                                                                  
accountability on performance measures in telecommunications for 52 developed and developing countries; while 
Gasmi and Recuero Virto (2008) test the relationship between telecommunications reforms and network expansion in 
developing countries. 
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progress in the telecommunication industry, as this would lower costs and, in turn, prices if NRAs 
successfully enforce “cost oriented” regulation.21  We lag TFP one year because the regulator’s 
information set at the time of the regulatory price review is typically based on previous years’ 
accounting data.  
Finally, in the specification of the retail price index regression, we also include an index of  
“regulatory intensity”, the overall Plaut Economics Regulation Index (Zenhausern, Telser, 
Vaterlaus, Mahler, 2007), allowing us to investigate the role of several elements of regulation such 
as market entry, density and enforcement of price and quantity regulation, and other aspects that 
may be relevant for investment incentives. Regulatory intensity, which ranges from 0 (low 
intensity) to 1 (high intensity), is expected to have a negative impact on the retail price index.22 As 
both the regulatory independence and the regulatory intensity indexes vary over time (as well as 
across countries/firms), they also contribute to controlling for the changing rules and performance 
of regulation in a period, such as the 1997-2005 years, when most EU countries liberalized the 
telecommunication market, privatized their PTOs and set up, for the first time, an independent 
regulatory framework.  
Table 2 reports the results. In Panel A, the coefficients are estimated with a simple fixed 
effects model. We notice that the results for the wholesale rates in columns (1) and (2) are 
consistent with our predictions. The TFP Index enters with a negative and significant coefficient, 
suggesting that both the Local Rate and the Single Tandem Rate decline as productivity increases 
(i.e. as costs also decrease). The Regulatory Index also enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient confirming that more independent regulators are more successful in setting lower rates. 
The remaining columns report the results for the retail index. In Column (3), we find that, similarly 
to wholesale rates, both the TFP and the EURI Index enter with negative and significant 
coefficients, while in Column (4) we tests the effect of the Plaut index of regulatory index and find 
that tighter regulatory intensity appears related with lower prices.     
In Panel B we include time dummies to control for factors that vary over time but are 
common across firms. The results are interesting. We find that the coefficient on Total Factor 
Productivity is no longer significant for both Local and Single tandem rates. This suggests not only 
                                                 
21 Our TFP index is an aggregate measure of the total factor productivity change at firm level. Unfortunately, because  
revenue and cost micro data for different types of output are not available we are not able to estimate the TFP trend for 
each specific output (see Fuss and Waverman, 2002 for a general analysis of TFP estimation in telecoms). An 
alternative to “proxy” the firm specific evolution of production cost would be to include a country specific index, like 
the degree of urbanization (percentage of population living in urban areas) or the population density (population per 
squared kilometre), as in Edwards and Waverman (2006). .  
22 We do not include the Plaut Index – which covers many features of the access regulation (such as the existence of 
accounting separation requirements, full unbundling, bitstream access, line sharing, etc.) - in the wholesale rates 
regressions because of likely reverse causality problems.  
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that a relationship exists between the time dummies and the productivity trend, but also that the 
effect of the firm specific productivity growth is in practice captured by the common trend in the 
time dummies. We find a similar result in columns (3) and (4), for the retail prices.  Once we 
control for the time fixed effects, also the EURI index turns insignificant in all specifications, while, 
in column (4), the Plaut index turns positive, though not significantly so.  As both regulatory 
independence and intensity have a trend of their own (think, for example, of domestic reforms 
prompted by the EC), it is not surprising that their impact on prices weakens when we include the 
time dummies. Overall, taking together the results in Panels A and B, we may conclude that the 
level of regulatory independence and intensity (as measured by the value of the indexes), hence 
their differences across countries, matter more than their trends over time.  
Finally, in Panel C we present the results from instrumental variables estimation (two-stage-
least squares), which we employ because unobserved variables related to the institutional and 
regulatory environment may simultaneously determine both regulatory independence/intensity 
index and the regulated rates. For example, as remarked by Edwards and Waverman (2006, p. 48), 
countries where the informal institutional endowments that preserve regulatory independence are 
weaker are more likely to establish tighter and more formal rules and safeguards against 
government interference, thus creating a positive bias in the effect of the index due to the 
unobserved characteristics of the regulatory environment. To instrument the EURI index in columns 
(1)-(3), and the Plaut index in column (4), we use a set of variables that control for characteristics of 
institutional and political systems, as well as sectoral and ownership variables.23 All regressions add 
firm and year fixed effects.  
The results in Columns (1) and (2) are similar. Once we account for potential endogeneity of 
the EURI index, we find that regulatory independence does matter in both the Local Rate and the 
Single transit rate regressions (the p-value of the EURI coefficient in the single transit regression is 
13.7%). The negative coefficients indicate that access prices tend to be lower if the regulator is 
(more) independent from government influence. In contrast, in Columns (3) and (4) we find that the 
                                                 
23 The instrument set includes Political Orientation, Political institutional disproportionality”, the OECD index of 
Market Entry, and the ownership share held by the state. Political orientation is an index ranging from 0 (extreme left 
wing) to 10 (extreme right wing) and is computed as the weighted average of the right-left political orientation scores of 
the parties forming the executive branch of the government. Higher values of the political orientation index are typically 
associated with more pro-firm regulation. The Political institutional Gallagher index of disproportionality allows a 
categorization of countries based on a majoritarian-consensual dimension and is a measure of government stability and 
of the veto-power of minority parties The index is continuous; it equals zero when the apportionment of parliamentary 
seats is exactly proportional to electoral results, and it increases as disproportionality increases (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 
2008).  Market Entry reflects the terms and conditions of third party access and the degree of market openness at 
wholesale and retail level in the telecommunication industry. It is an index of market liberalization rather than an index 
of regulation (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). The Government ownership share is constructed according to the weakest 
link approach to measure the state’s ultimate control rights (UCR)(see BCRS, 2008). 
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impact of both regulatory independence and intensity on retail prices remains insignificant.  Turning 
to the effect of total factor productivity on the wholesale charges, our findings show that the 
coefficients are negative and significant in both columns (1) and (2), suggesting that regulators 
successfully enforced the cost-orientation principle. This result is consistent with Edwards and 
Waverman (2006) who used country specific indexes to proxy production costs. In Columns (3) and 
(4), we find again that TFP does not display any significant impact on the retail price index. The 
lack of a significant effect of TFP on retail prices was somewhat expected because, as described in 
Section 4, the retail price indexes encompass the (opposite) trends of various - usage and fixed – 
charges, where only the former are likely to be affected by productivity growth or by cost reduction.  
 
 
5.1.2 Investment 
We now turn to the estimation of a dynamic investment model where we add regulatory 
variables. We derive our empirical model from the microeconometric literature on company 
investment24 which suggests to include the lagged investment ratio to account for capital stock 
adjustment, demand growth, as measured by the log difference of firm sales, to account for 
accelerator effects, and the cash flow to capital stock to account for capital markets imperfections 
and asymmetric information problems that may cause investment decisions to be constrained by the 
amount of internal funds. To account for the impact of the institutional and regulatory framework, 
we then add, in turn, the index of Political Orientation, the EURI index of regulatory independence, 
the Plaut index of regulatory intensity, and the OECD index of Market Entry.  To estimate this 
model we use the Generalised Method of Moments proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), which is especially designed for dynamic models where right-hand 
variables, including the lagged dependent variable, are not strictly exogenous. GMM estimation 
also deals with the dynamic panel bias that arises when the lagged dependent variable may be 
correlated with the error term even when the firm fixed effects are wiped out by first-differencing. 
Our GMM estimates employ t-2 lags of the dependent variable and of other non-strictly exogenous 
regressors, such as the cash flow to fixed capital, the growth rate of real sales, and the regulatory 
indexes. To test the validity of the instruments, we use the two-step Sargan-Hansen statistic under 
the null of joint validity of the instruments results and we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Hubbard (1998) for a comprehensive survey of company investment models estimated with panel 
data and of the debate on the impact of financing constraints on company investment.  
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autocorrelation test control for AR(1) and AR(2) and report the results with the regression, Firm and 
time specific fixed effects are included as regressors and as instruments.    
Table 3 reports the results. In column (1) we test the baseline specification and find that the 
accelerator term (the contemporaneous sales growth term) is significant and has the predicted 
positive sign. The lagged investment rate is insignificant while the lagged cash flow rate enters with 
a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that the PTOs’ investment is constrained by the 
available flow of internal finance. These results are robust throughout the remaining columns of 
Table 3.  
In Column (2), we add Political Orientation and find that the coefficient takes a positive and 
significant sign, suggesting that PTOs tend to increase their investment rates under more 
conservative governments. Although PTOs are ultimately public utilities, most of them have been 
fully privatized (even before our sample period starts) and therefore positively react to right-wing 
changes in the government that are more likely to carry out pro-firm policies (such as, for example, 
looser taxation on profits). In Column (3), we test the effect of the OECD Market Entry index and 
find that the coefficient is negative and significant (the p-value is at 6%). Since the value of index 
increases when entry gets more difficult, the negative sign implies that PTOs tend to invest more as 
entry in the downstream segment becomes easier.25 In columns (4) and (5) we test whether either 
Regulatory Independence or Intensity influence investment, but we do not find any significant 
result. The remaining columns investigate the effect of the regulatory variables once we control for 
the political orientation of the government. The results show that Political orientation keeps its sign 
and significance in all specifications. Of the three regulatory variables, only Market Entry enters 
with negative coefficients, confirming a positive effect of entry liberalization on investment, 
regardless of the orientation of the political party in charge. 
 
5.1.3 Leverage 
We investigate the determinants of PTOs capital structure decisions by estimating a simple 
leverage model that includes various firm characteristics that were shown in the empirical corporate 
finance literature to be reliable determinants of capital structure.26  Specifically, the set of controls 
includes the log of real total assets to control for firm’s size (size is typically shown to have a 
positive effect of leverage), the ratio of fixed to total assets which reflects asset tangibility (tangible 
                                                 
25 This result is consistent with Alesina et al.  (2005).   
26 For common firm characteristics that are included in leverage regressions see for example, Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), and Frank and Goyal (2007).  
Access Regulation, Financial Structure and Investment in Vertically Integrated Utilities
  18
assets can serve as collateral and hence lower the cost of debt financing), the ratio of EBIT 
(earnings before interests and taxes) to total assets which is a proxy for profitability and 
“efficiency,” (more efficient firms are likely to have higher earnings with the same assets), and the 
ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets as a proxy for non-debt tax shields (tax 
deductions for depreciations are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing).  We then add the 
Political Orientation index and, in turn, the OECD Market Entry index, the Regulatory 
Independence, EURI index and the Regulatory Intensity, Plaut indexes. Table 4 reports the fixed 
effects estimates where both firm and time specific fixed effects are included.  
Column (1) reports the result for the baseline specification. Both firm size and tangibility of 
assets enter with a significant coefficient. While the positive coefficient on firm size is quite typical, 
as not surprisingly largest firms may find it easier to obtain more leverage, the coefficient on 
tangibility is negative, in contrast with earlier studies, as tangible assets are thought to serve as a 
collateral and hence to lower the cost of debt financing. In our sample of PTOs, however, fixed 
assets are highly firm specific and non-redeployable and may therefore serve as poor collaterals, 
even leading to a negative relationship with leverage. Political Orientation is the only other 
significant variable, entering the regression with a negative coefficient. If right-wing governments 
are more pro-firm and more oriented to favour the capital market than left-wing governments, then 
the negative coefficient suggests that firms may find it easier to fund themselves on the stock 
market, hence raising equity instead of debt.   
When we turn to the regulatory variables, we find that neither OECD market entry nor 
regulatory independence have a significant coefficient. However, the Plaut index of Regulatory 
Intensity displays a significant coefficient. The positive sign is consistent with our theoretical 
predictions, as leverage is found to be higher when the regulatory pressure increases (see also 
Spiegel and Spulber, 1994 and BCRS, 2008).  
 
5.2 Leverage-Price Granger causality tests  
  If debt, and the related threat of financial distress, is used as a shield to protect firms’ 
investment decisions from regulatory opportunism, then regulated rates should increase as leverage 
increases, and also investment should increase as leverage increases.  In this section we test the 
hypothesis that higher leverage induces regulators to raise regulated prices.  However, if we literally 
follow the “circularity” argument whereby regulators set the price to ensure firms a “fair rate of 
return” which depends on the firm’s cost of capital and this in turn depends on the firm’s capital 
structure, then causality in this relationship might run the other way round, and the regulated price 
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would be find to positively affect leverage.  This situation could arise if regulators make a long-
term commitment to regulated prices, which in turn determines the firm’s revenue (up to exogenous 
demand shocks). The firm would then adjust its capital structure accordingly to fit its expected 
revenue stream. Alternatively, it could be that leverage and regulated prices are correlated, but 
neither one Granger-causes the other; rather the two variables are correlated with a third variable 
that causes both of them. 
We investigate the direction of the price-leverage relationship by performing the Granger 
causality tests, which estimates the following bivariate autoregressive processes for the leverage 
and, alternatively, the country-specific Local access rates, Single transit rates and the Retail price 
indexes.  These tests are used to examine whether leverage Granger-causes regulated prices as the 
theory predicts.  
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where Pi,t is the regulated price of firm i in period t, Levi,t is the leverage of firm i in period t, Yeart 
is a year dummy - capturing the yearly technological trend and productivity growth -, μi is a firm 
dummy, and ε is white noise. If leverage Granger-causes prices but not vice versa, then β1 and β2 
are jointly significant while γ1 and γ2 are not. Therefore, we also report a Wald statistics test that 
Levi,t-1 and Levi,t-2 contribute significantly to the explanatory power of regression (1), while Pi,t-1 and 
Pi,t-2 do not contribute significantly to the explanatory power of equation (2).  As this is a dynamic 
model, similarly to the investment equation in Section 5.1.2, we use the Generalised Method of 
Moments proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998).    
The results are in Tables 5.a and 5.b. The estimated coefficients and the Wald tests in Table 
5.a show that the lagged leverage terms are jointly significant in columns (1) and (3), but not in 
column (2), which suggests that leverage has a positive significant effect on Single transit access 
charges and on the Retail prices, but not on Local access rates.  In panel B, we test the opposite 
hypothesis. Our results show that in all columns we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two lagged 
price terms are jointly zero. These results imply that leverage Granger-causes regulated prices both 
at the wholesale (Single transit) and at the retail level, consistently with the hypothesis that 
regulated firms choose their leverage strategically in order to boost their prices. Our results so reject 
the alternative hypotheses that long-term regulatory commitments to prices induce firms to adjust 
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their capital structure to match their resulting expected revenue stream, or that leverage and 
regulated prices are driven by a third variable that causes both of them. More specifically, leverage 
is found to have a significant impact on regulated rates for retail telecom services and for Single 
transit access mode, which is prevailing within the service-based competition framework that 
characterized European telecoms in our sample period.  
 
5.3 Leverage-Market Competition Granger causality tests 
In Section 3 we emphasized the potential implications of the leverage and wholesale rates 
causality relationship for the competition in the downstream retail segment of an industry with a 
vertical structure, like telecommunications. High leverage might display a negative effect on 
competition if the regulator raises the access charge, driven by concerns over the industry/PTO’s  
financial stability.  In this case potential entrants would be discouraged to enter the retail market, 
and alternative operators would have to pay a higher cost/tariff to access the network. If however, 
the regulator raises both the access and retail charges, then the alternative operators would be less 
financially squeezed and the impact on competition would be less detrimental. To investigate 
whether the strategic use of debt has a downside effect on competition in the retail segment, we test 
the relationship between PTOs’ leverage and two different variables to proxy for market 
competition. One is the Number of Competitors in the telecommunications market, as defined by 
the EC report (2006), i.e. the number of operators that, along with the PTO, have a combined 
market share of at least 90% of the global voice fixed telephony market. The other is the Market 
Share of the Incumbent PTO operator in the retail segment (EC report, 2006). 
To investigate the causality in the relationship between leverage and market competition we 
perform, similarly to section 5.2, a Granger-causality test that estimates a bivariate autoregressive 
process for the leverage and a measure of competition:  
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where MC is alternatively the Number of Competitors and the Market Share of the incumbent in the 
retail sector and the other variables are defined as in Equations (1) and (2).  
The results are reported in Table 6. In Panel A, column (1), the once lagged leverage term is 
insignificant, but the twice-lagged term is negative and highly significant. The Wald test confirms 
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that the two leverage terms significantly contribute to explaining the Number of Competitors. 
Before drawing the implications of this result, we check in Panel B whether there is reverse 
causality, i.e. whether lags of the Number of Competitors enter the dynamic leverage equation.  
This might be the case if competitive pressure in the retail segment reduces retail prices and 
deteriorates the profitability of the incumbent operator, leading it to increase the financial leverage. 
The results in Table 6.b show that this is not the case, as none of the coefficients for the Number of 
Competitors variable are either individually or jointly significant in explaining leverage, thus 
suggesting that the number of downstream competitors decreases as the PTO increases its leverage.   
In column (2) we then investigate the relationship between the PTO’s leverage and Market 
Share in the retail sector. The estimated results support the evidence from the Number of 
Competitors’ regressions. Financial leverage has a positive and significant effect on the PTO’s 
Market Share, suggesting that the higher the leverage the stronger the dominant position of 
incumbent. The Wald tests shows that the two leverage terms are jointly significant, while the 
reverse causality test in Panel B, column (2) show that the PTO’s Market Share does not contribute 
to explaining leverage.  Taken together the results in columns (1) and (2) show that an increase in 
the PTO’s leverage leads to a smaller number of competitors and to a greater market share of the 
incumbent in the retail segment of the telecommunications industry, suggesting that the strategic 
use of leverage may deliver a negative effect on the degree of market competition which is 
potentially in contrast with social welfare.  
To better understand the consequences of the strategic use of leverage, in the following 
section we analyze the impact of debt on the PTOs’ investment decisions.        
 
5.4 Leverage – Investment Equations 
The interaction between capital structure and regulated rates in Spiegel and Spulber’s model 
naturally extends to the lack of commitment-underinvestment problem that afflicts network 
infrastructure in regulated industries.  In this setting, the strategic use of leverage is thus justified by 
the need to discipline the regulator’s opportunistic behavior (i.e. the ex-post price reduction) and to 
enhance firms’ ex ante investment incentives.  If this is the case we should observe a positive 
relationship between debt and investment.  
The relationship between leverage and investment is inherently endogenous, because if a 
firm plans to invest in year t, it may issue debt in t-1 (or even t-2), and if the investment project 
takes time to be realized, then adjustment lags in the investment plan today generates financial 
requirements and debt issues tomorrow. The persisting nature of this endogeneity is difficult, if not 
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impossible, to control even if instrumental variable techniques are used. Without claiming to have 
solved this problem, we try nonetheless to throw some light on the dynamic relationship between 
leverage and investment by using Granger tests (as in sections 5.2 and 5.3) and by using the GMM-
DIFF estimator for dynamic panel models where all right-hand variables, not only the lagged 
dependent variable, are endogenous. We thus estimate the following bivariate autoregressive 
process for the fixed investment to capital stock rate and a measure of leverage: 
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where IKi,t is the fixed investment to capital stock rate of  firm i in period t, Levi,t is the leverage of 
firm i in period t, Yeart is a year dummy, μi is a firm dummy, and ε is white noise. If, as the theory 
predicts, leverage Granger-causes the investment rate of the firm, but not vice versa, then β1 and β2 
are jointly significant while γ1 and γ2 are not. Therefore, we report the usual Wald tests to indicate 
whether Levi,t-1 and Levi,t-2 contribute significantly to the explanatory power of regression (5), while 
IKi,t-1 and IKi,t-2 do not contribute significantly to the explanatory power of equation (4).  For 
robustness, in columns (2) and (3) we report the results for two alternative measures of 
indebtedness, the debt to total assets ratio and the debt to sales ratio.27  
We present our results in tables 7.a and 7.b. In Panel A, we find that the estimated 
coefficients of the lagged leverage terms are found to be jointly significant regardless of the 
leverage definition we use. In contrast, in Panel B, we find that the investment rate does not 
significantly contribute to explaining the leverage, as the once and twice lagged coefficients are 
neither individually nor jointly significant.  Taken together, these results indicate that leverage 
Granger-causes investment (and not vice-versa), and provide empirical support to the prediction of 
the theoretical model, i.e. that leverage strengthens the firms’ incentives to invest.  
The results from the leverage-investment regressions in Table 7 jointly with our findings 
from the leverage-price and leverage-competition regressions in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with 
the idea that the strategic use of leverage, as a means to discipline the regulator’s incentives to 
reduce the wholesale charges once the firm has invested, may somewhat impair or delay 
                                                 
27 See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) who also use these alternative variables to complement the standard 
financial debt to equity ratio. 
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competition in the retail segment, but has a favorable counterpart in mitigating the underinvestment 
problem.   
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have theoretically and empirically examined the relationship between 
access regulation, financial structure and investment in the European telecommunications market. 
Specifically, since leverage affects both the way NRAs set regulated wholesale charges and the 
firm’s investment decision, debt may serve as a strategic tool for the regulated firm, ultimately 
influencing the regulator’s pricing decision and so the degree of competition in the downstream 
segment of the market. Using a panel of 15 EU Public Telecommunication Operators (PTOs) over 
the period 1994-2005, we have first investigated the determinants of wholesale and retail rates as 
well as the variables affecting financial and investment decisions. We have then tested whether 
higher PTOs’ financial leverage leads to (Granger-causes): i) higher regulated wholesale and retail 
rates, ii) weaker competition in the retail services sector, and iii) higher PTOs’ investment rates.  
The empirical investigation controls for key features of the institutional context, such as the 
intensity of market openness, the degree of regulatory independence and intensity, the regulatory 
climate through political variables and, more importantly, for firm productivity growth as a proxy 
for technological change. We deal with endogeneity problems by applying instrumental variable 
methods that either use institutional and political variables to instrument the regulatory environment 
or framework or employ lags of internal right-hand variables (GMM estimator) when dynamic 
models and, particularly, the Granger tests are estimated.   
Our results show that an increase in leverage positively affects regulated rates, both at the 
retail and at the wholesale level. We also find that increases in leverage have a negative impact on 
competition. In particular we find that leverage leads to a lower number of competitors and to larger 
PTO’s market share in the retail service sector. Finally we find that financial leverage has a positive 
effect on the PTOs’ investment rate. This suggests that the strategic use of debt to discipline the 
regulator’s lack of commitment within a vertically integrated network industry may somewhat 
impair or delay competition in the retail segment, but has a favorable counterpart in mitigating the 
underinvestment problem.  
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FIGURE 1 – AVERAGE LEVEL OF INTERCONNECTION RATES FOR LOCAL (PRICELOCAL), SINGLE TRANSIT 
(PRICESINGLE) ACCESS SERVICES IN EUROPE 15 
(SOURCE: EC VARIOUS YEARS) 
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FIGURE 2 – AVERAGE RETAIL TELECOM SERVICE PRICE INDEX (2005=100) 
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FIGURE 3A  –  LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY OF EU PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS (PTOS) 
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FIGURE 3B – TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY INDEX OF EU PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
OPERATORS (PTOS) 
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FIGURE 4A – BOOK LEVERAGE OF EU PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS (PTOS) 
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FIGURE 5  - AVERAGE INVESTMENT RATE OF  EU PTOS 
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TABLE 1 - SUMMARY STATISTICS 
15 PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS (PTOS) 1994 – 2005 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N. Obs. 
      
Investment Rate   0.157 0.106 -0.166 0.578 127 
Leverage 0.317 0.223 0.000 1.000 157 
Debt-to-sales 0.479 0.834 0.000 7.125 157 
Debt-to-total assets 0.199 0.309 0.000 2.982 157 
Total Assets (log) 12.110 1.343 8.038 14.256 158 
Real sales (log) 11.418 1.253 7.835 13.595 158 
Tangibility 0.507 0.178 0.129 0.835 158 
Labour productivity 2.249 0.959 0.336 5.238 136 
EBIT-to-Asset  0.071 0.118 -0.976 0.299 155 
Market-to Book (Equity) 3.062 2.809 0.402 27.405 129 
      
      
      
 
 
 
Carlo Cambini and Laura Rondi
  31
TABLE 2 – REGRESSION RESULTS FOR WHOLESALE AND RETAIL RATES 
The dependent variable is the Local and Single transit interconnection rates in columns (1) and (2) 
respectively, and the fixed telecommunications retail price index in columns (3)-(4). Fixed effects and IV 
(2SLS) estimates. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.   
Panel A - OLS 
Dependent Variable 
 
Local  
Rate 
Single 
Transit 
Retail  
Price 
Retail  
Price 
Total Factor Productivity Indext-1 -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.252*** -0.187*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.036) (0.040) 
EURI-I Index -0.196** -0.115** -3.131*** - 
 (0.092) (0.048) (1.029) - 
Plaut Index of Reg. Intensity - - - -33.459*** 
 - - - (2.939) 
     
Firm Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies NO NO NO NO 
     
R squared  0.388 0.570 0.468 0.553 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [108] 15 [108] 15 [115] 15 [114] 
Panel B – Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable 
 
Local 
Rate 
Single 
Transit 
Retail 
Price 
Retail 
Price 
Total Factor Productivity Index t-1 - 0.006 - 0.004 0.026 0.035 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.112) (0.116) 
EURI-I Index -0.145a -0.004 -0.211 - 
 (0.098) (0.046) (0.771) - 
Plaut Index of Reg. Intensity - - - 11.982 
 - - - (7.473) 
     
Firm Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
     
R squared  0.554 0.796 0.762 0.738 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [108] 15 [108] 15 [115] 15 [115] 
Panel C – Instrumental variables 
Dependent Variable 
 
Local 
Rate 
Single 
Transit 
Retail 
Price 
Retail 
Price 
Total Factor Productivity Index t-1 - 0.013* - 0.008** -0.140 0.065 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.155) (0.147) 
EURI-I Index -0.469* -0.173b -7.963* - 
 (0.242) (0.111) (4.829) - 
Plaut Index of Reg. Intensity - - - 54.274 
 - - - (21.839) 
     
Firm Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
     
R squared  0.557 0.835 0.647 0.707 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [108] 15 [108] 15 [115] 15 [115] 
  a P value = 0.145  
  b P value = 0.124 
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TABLE 3– DYNAMIC INVESTMENT MODEL OF EU TELECOMS (1994-2005) 
The dependent variable is the ratio between fixed investment and fixed capital stock at replacement value. Dynamic Panel estimation, one-step difference GMM. 
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.   
Investment to Capital Stock (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fixed Investment to Capital Stock t-1 -0.213 -0.145 -0.251 -0.216 -0.232 -0.210 -0.203 -0.202 
 (0.201) (0.203) (0.192) (0.196) (0.269) (0.183) (0.163) (0.267) 
Sales Growth t 0.625*** 0.585*** 0.640*** 0.632*** 0.548** 0.632*** 0.646*** 0.550** 
 (0.174) (0.194) (0.162) (0.173) (0.254) (0.172) (0.143) (0.263) 
Sales Growtht-1 0.049 0.019 0.065 0.055 0.022 0.060 0.069 0.023 
 (0.157) (0.174) (0.140) (0.152) (0.190) (0.144) (0.135) (0.208) 
Cash Flow to Capital Stock t 0.064 0.030 0.071 0.072 0.131 0.030 0.032 0.050 
 (0.149) (0.148) (0.151) (0.147) (0.260) (0.146) (0.141) (0.205) 
Cash Flow to Capital Stock t-1  0.525*** 0.541*** 0.526*** 0.526*** 0.645** 0.536*** 0.522*** 0.562** 
 (0.169) (0.175) (0.165) (0.171) (0.283) (0.164) (0.167) (0.256) 
Political Orientation - 0.023** - - - 0.028** 0.024** 0.024* 
 - (0.010) - - - (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) 
OECD entry - - -0.010* - - -0.015** - - 
 - - (0.005) - - (0.007) - - 
EURI-I Index - - - 0.002 - - 0.001 - 
 - - - (0.013) - - (0.013) - 
Plaut Index of Regulatory Intensity - - - - -0.357 - - -0.209 
 - - - - (0.631) - - (0.646) 
         
         
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.034 0.021 0.024 0.035 0.135 0.010 0.016 0.055 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.254 0.129 0.303 0.276 0.765 0.114 0.130 0.184 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.326 0.530 0.479 0.807 0.343 0.821 0.994 0.481 
N. Firms [N. obs.] 16 [79] 16 [79] 16 [79] 16 [79] 15 [69] 16 [79] 16 [79] 15 [69] 
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TABLE 4 -  LEVERAGE EQUATION FOR EU TELECOMS (1994-2005) 
Leverage is defined as the sum of short and long-term financial debt divided by the sum of short-, long-term 
financial debt and equity. Fixed effects estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and also to within group serial correlation.. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10%.   
 
Leverage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of real total assets 0.146** 0.141** 0.147** 0.110a 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.072) 
Fixed-to-Total Assets -0.432*** -0.448*** -0.431*** -0.412** 
 (0.148) (0.146) (0.147) (0.189) 
EBIT-to-Total Assets 0.110 0.112 0.108 0.091 
 (0.124) (0.127) (0.127) (0.145) 
Debt Tax Shield -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Political Orientation  -0.023** -0.023** -0.023** -0.037** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) 
OECD Index – Market entry - 0.006 - - 
 - (0.011) - - 
EURI-I Index - - 0.002 - 
 - - (0.028) - 
Plaut Index of Regulatory Intensity - - - 0.595* 
 - - - (0.332) 
     
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
R squared within 0.405 0.422 0.424 0.297 
     
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 16 [154] 16 [154] 16 [154] 16 [126] 
 
a p value = 0.128 
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TABLE 5 - PANEL A – REGULATED PRICE AND LEVERAGE – GRANGER TESTS 
Leverage is defined as the sum of short and long-term financial debt divided by the sum of short-, long-term 
financial debt and equity. Each column reports estimated coefficients for Granger causality tests as in eqs. [1] and 
[2] of the relationship between Leverage and Regulated Prices.  We present results for the Single transit charge in 
column (1), for the Local transit charge in column (2), and for the Retail price index in column (3). Dynamic 
panel estimation, one-step difference GMM estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to 
heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation.        
Dependent variable: Regulated Price 
(1) 
Single Transit  
(2) 
Local Transit 
(3) 
Retail Price 
α1 Regulated Pricet-1  1.267*** 1.155** 0.390** 
 (0.392) (0.415) (0.168) 
 α2 Regulated Pricet-2 -0.058 -0.481 0.421* 
 (0.430) (0.343) (0.228) 
β1 Leveraget-1 77.344 41.848 7.932** 
 (49.830) (35.868) (3.344) 
 β2 Leveraget-2 108.506** 66.560 10.250** 
 (51.476) (44.627) (3.914) 
    
P-value test on H0: β1 = β2 = 0 2.69 (0.10)* 1.11 (0.35) 4.35(0.03)** 
P-value test on H0: β1 + β2 = 0 3.51(0.08)* 2.03(0.17) 8.68(0.01)*** 
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.253 0.051 0.914 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.349 0.295 0.062 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.708 0.408 0.998 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [68] 15 [68] 15 [88] 
 
. 
TABLE 5 PANELB – LEVERAGE AND REGULATED PRICE – GRANGER TESTS 
Dependent variable:  Leverage 
(1) 
Single Transit  
(2) 
Local Transit 
(3) 
Retail Price 
δ1 Leveraget-1 -1.017** -0.960** -0.430 
 (0.382) (0.423) (0.338) 
δ2 Leveraget-2 -0.858** -0.932** -0.275 
 (0.301) (0.321) (0.245) 
γ1 Regulated Pricet-1 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
γ2 Regulated Pricet-2 0.002 0.005 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) 
    
P-value test on H0: γ1 = γ2 = 0 0.14 (0.87) 1.03 (0.38) 0.30 (0.74) 
    
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.183 0.120 0.384 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.822 0.657 0.102 
Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying 
restrictions (p-value) 0.878 0.817 0.997 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [68] 15 [68] 15 [88] 
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TABLE 6 PANEL A – COMPETITION IN TLC AND LEVERAGE – GRANGER TESTS 
In both tables, each column reports estimated coefficients for Granger causality tests of the relationship 
between Measures of Competition in EU TLC industry and Leverage, as in eqs. [3] and [4]. Column (1) 
presents results for the relationship between Leverage and the Number of Competitors in the retail segment. 
Column (2) presents results for the relationship between Leverage and the Market Share of the Incumbent 
PTO operator in the retail segment. Dynamic panel estimation, one-step system GMM estimates. Standard 
errors in parentheses are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. 
Dependent variable: Competition Variable  
(1) 
Number of 
Competitors 
(2) 
Market Share of the 
Incumbent 
α1 Competition Measuret-1  0.783*** 0.972*** 
 (0.167) (0.088) 
α2 Competition Measuret-2 0.243 -0.006 
 (0.206) (0.104) 
β1 Leveraget-1 0.469 5.364** 
 (0.829) (2.388) 
β 2 Leveraget-2 -2.988** 4.468 
 (1.049) (6.465) 
   
P-value test on H0: β1 = β2 = 0 4.87 (0.02)** 7.98 (0.02)** 
P-value test on H0β1 +β2 = 0 7.92(0.01)*** 2.73 (0.09)* 
   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.003 0.031 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.898 0.362 
Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying 
restrictions (p-value) 1.000 1.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [94] 15 [90] 
 
TABLE 6 - PANEL B – LEVERAGE AND COMPETITION IN TLC -  GRANGER TESTS 
Dependent variable: Leverage 
(1) 
Number of 
Competitors 
(2) 
Market Share of the 
Incumbent 
δ1 Leveraget-1 0.604*** 0.571*** 
 (0.139) (0.171) 
δ1 Leveraget-2 0.314 0.342 
 (0.211) (0.200) 
γ1 Competition Measuret-1 0.015 0.003 
 (0.018) (0.004) 
γ2 Competition Measuret-2 -0.031 -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.004) 
   
P-value test on H0: γ1 = γ2 = 0  1.08 (0.37) 0.32 (0.73) 
   
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.006 0.006 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.182 0.486 
Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying 
restrictions (p-value) 1.000 1.000 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 15 [94] 15 [91] 
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TABLE 7.A – INVESTMENT AND LEVERAGE – GRANGER TESTS 
In both tables, each column reports estimated coefficients for Granger causality tests of the relationship 
between Investment and Leverage, as in eqs. [5] and [6]. Column (1) presents results for the financial 
leverage (financial debt/(financial debt + equity). Column (2) presents results for the financial debt-to-total 
asset ratio. Dynamic panel estimation, one-step difference GMM estimates. Standard errors in parentheses 
are robust to heteroschedasticity and to within group serial correlation. 
Dependent variable: Investment rate 
(1) 
Leverage 
Debt/(Debt+Equity) 
(2) 
Debt-to-Total  
Asset 
(3) 
Debt-to-Sales 
Ratio 
α1 Investment ratet-1  -0.122 -0.280 -0.208 
 (0.235) (0.289) (0.285) 
α2 Investment ratet-2 0.061 -0.607* -0.599** 
 (0.112) (0.297) (0.267) 
β1 Leveraget-1 or Debt-to-Assetst-1 or Debt-to-Salest-1 -0.026 0.280** 0.085** 
 (0.063) (0.125) (0.035) 
β 2 Leveraget-2 or Debt-to-Assetst-2 or Debt-to-Salest-2 0.518*** 0.388** 0.118*** 
 (0.180) (0.174) (0.043) 
    
P-value test on H0 β1 = β2 = 0 9.79 (0.007)*** 3.07 (0.07)* 3.85**(0.043) 
P-value test on H0 β1 +β2 = 0 5.63 (0.017)** 6.10(0.025)** 7.58(0.014)*** 
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.091 0.041 0.035 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.497 0.323 0.817 
Sargan-Hansen test  (p-value) 0.931 0.773 0.880 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 16 [76] 16 [76] 15 [76] 
 
TABLE 7.B – LEVERAGE AND INVESTMENT – GRANGER TESTS 
Dependent variable: Debt ratio 
(1) 
Leverage 
Debt/(Debt+Equ
ity)  
(2) 
Debt-to-Total  
Asset 
(3) 
Debt-to-Sales 
Ratio 
δ1 Leveraget-1 or Debt-to-Assetst-1 or Debt-to-Salest-1 -0.751 0.280 -0.722*** 
 (0.455) (0.388) (0.254) 
δ2 Leveraget-2 or Debt-to-Assetst-2 or Debt-to-Salest-2 -0.476** 0.362 -0.750*** 
 (0.181) (0.371) (0.203) 
γ1 Investment ratet-1 -0.044 0.203 1.632 
 (0.287) (0.367) (1.201) 
γ2 Investment ratet-2 0.040 0.004 2.770 
 (0.307) (0.354) (1.757) 
    
P-value test on H0: γ1 = γ2 = 0 0.10 (0.91) 0.24 (0.79) 1.28 (0.306) 
    
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) (p-value) 0.263 0.110 0.835 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) (p-value) 0.860 0.502 0.099 
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.980 0.746 0.816 
N. Firms [N. Obs.] 16 [90] 16 [90] 15 [90] 
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APPENDIX A1 – A STYLIZED MODEL 
 
Consider a vertically integrated monopoly where the incumbent operates both in the upstream and 
downstream segment of the market. In the upstream segment, the incumbent manages the telecoms 
network, the essential input of the industry. In the downstream segment the incumbent firm 
competes with alternative operators for providing retail services to final users. Following Laffont 
and Tirole (1994), the incumbent is regulated both at wholesale (access charge) and retail level; 
moreover, the incumbent faces a competitive fringe in the potentially competitive markets.1  In 
order to provide the retail service, both the downstream unit of the incumbent and all alternative 
operators have to buy access to the existing infrastructure. We assume that for providing one unit of 
final services each operator needs one unit of access. Define with a the access charge. In addition, 
denote with c  the per unit cost of the access faced by monopolistic firm. We assume – to simplify – 
that the cost of providing retail services (cr) is equal for both the incumbent firm and alternative 
operators. To model the firm’s choice of capital structure, we assume that the firm’s upstream costs 
are subject to random cost shocks. Therefore, upstream unit cost faced by the vertically integrated 
incumbent operator is given by c(1–z), where z is a random variable distributed uniformly over the 
unit interval. Hence, higher values of z correspond to “better” states of nature. Differently to Spiegel 
(1994), the random shock here impacts directly on the wholesale access charge and only indirectly 
on regulated retail charges. 
Consider for simplicity (but without a serious loss of insights) that the market faces a unit 
demand function. The consumers’ willingness to pay depends on the firm’s investment level, k, and 
is given by a twice differentiable function V(k), with 0>∂∂ kV , 022 <∂∂ kV . k can be interpreted 
as a measure of the “quality” of the firm’s product or the range of its services. Using p to denote the 
regulated retail price, consumers’ surplus is given by CS(k, p) = V(k) – p. The (unit) market demand 
is shared among the firms; denote with, QI and QE the quantity supplied downstream by the 
incumbent and by alternative operators as a whole, respectively, where QI + QE = 1. Finally, let c < 
V(0).  
Let D denote the face value of the firm’s debt, which the firm needs to cover from its 
revenue. The operating income of the regulated firm can now be written as the sum of retail and 
wholesale profit, which take the following expressions: the retail profit is equal to (p – a - cr)QI, 
                                                 
1 The assumption on fringe competition is made here for expositional purpose and leads us to get clear results and to 
derive well specified testable predictions. A similar assumption is used also in Armstrong and Vickers (1993) for 
similar reasons. 
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while the wholesale profit is (a – c(1 - z))(QI + QE). Therefore the operating profit of the incumbent 
is: 
 
πI (p, a, z) = )())1(()())1(( pQzcapQzccp EIr −−+−−−     (A1) 
 
while the operating profit of the alternative operators is: πE(p,a) = .)( Er Qcap −−  It is 
straightforward to note that competition in the market is asymmetric: the vertically integrated 
incumbent pays the marginal cost for the provision of the final service, i.e. )1( zccr −+ , while 
alternative operators’ marginal cost include the cost of access, i.e. rca + , that could differ from the 
underlying cost of access.  
Since alternative operators are price takers, they produce till the point in which their 
marginal cost equates the retail price, i.e. rcap +=  (see Laffont and Tirole, 1994). Intuitively, 
since alternative operators do not have any market power, they take the regulated price set to the 
incumbent and then they slightly undercut it by an infinitely small ε > 0, just to be attractive in the 
market. 
For a given debt obligation D and regulated rates p and a, let z*(p, a, D) denote the critical 
state of nature above which the regulated firm can pay D in full.  z*(p, a, D) is generally given by: 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+<+
++<+≤−−−+
+≤++
=
.1
,)(
,0
),,(*
IrEI
IrEI
EIr
EIIr
QcDaQpQ
QccDaQpQD
c
aQQcpcD
aQpQQccD
Dapz        (A2) 
 
Equation (A2) implies that as long as the revenues ( EI aQpQ + ) cover the debt obligation 
and the cost, then the probability of financial distress is zero. If the revenues are larger than the debt 
obligation but lower than the sum of debt and operating cost, the probability of financial distress is 
positive; finally, if retail and wholesale revenues do not cover the debt obligation in full and the 
downstream retail costs even when the cost for providing the access is zero, then the probability of 
financial distress is 1. Note that this probability weakly increases with D and decreases with p and 
a. Since rcap += , instead of using p, we now rewrite the model using a as the main variable. 
Equation (2) becomes: 
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⎪⎩
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Let T be the (fixed) cost of financial distress which occurs when the firm fails to meet its 
debt obligation. We can now rewrite the expected profit of the regulated vertically integrated firm 
as follows: 
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Substituting for z*(a,D) from equation (A3) and rearranging, yields: 
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It is worth noting that, under the assumption that the incumbent competes with a fringe, 
equations (A4) and (A5) correspond to the profit function of a pure monopolist in Spiegel (1994, 
pag. 301). In other words, starting from a different setting with a vertically integrated and regulated 
incumbent facing downstream competition by a fringe, we are able to reproduce the original model 
of Spiegel (1994) with the difference that in our model the access charge is regulated while the 
retail tariff is indirectly set though a. Considering the purpose of this paper, which is mainly 
empirical, we now determine the optimal regulated access price and its interplay with the debt D. 
This allows us to derive predictions on the impact of D on the degree of market competition. On the 
contrary, since the framework is analogous, we refer the reader to Spiegel (1994) and Spiegel and 
Spulber (1994) for the technical analysis of the optimal choices of the capital structure and 
investment 
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Following Spulber (1989), we assume that the wholesale price is determined by bargaining 
between the firm which is interested in maximizing its profit and the regulator who is interested in 
maximizing consumers’ surplus. Using the generalized Nash-bargaining solution, the regulated 
wholesale price is given by: 
γγ π −= 1),())(,(max DaapkCSArg
a
 
where )(),(),( aDaDa EI πππ +=  is the aggregate profit of the industry. The parameter γ captures 
the regulatory climate: the higher γ is, the more pro-consumer the regulator is. Note that we 
maximize welfare with respect to a and not to p, but after determining the optimal a we can 
indirectly define the optimal regulated retail price p. 
The strategic interaction between the firm and the regulator evolves in three stages. In stage 
1, the firm chooses its investment level, k, and its debt level, D. If the funds raised by issuing D are 
insufficient to finance k, the firm can raise additional funds by issuing equity. In stage 2, the market 
value debt (and possibly equity) is determined in a competitive capital market. In stage 3, given k 
and D, the regulated wholesale charge (a) is set by the regulator. Finally, the random variable z is 
realized, output is produced, and payments are made. 
Using the same procedure as in Spiegel (1994; see the Appendix), we obtain the following 
optimal wholesale rate: 
 
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
>++
≤<++
≤<+
≤+
=
).()(
)()()()(
)()(
),()(
*
31
321
21
11
kMDTckM
kMDkMDMckM
kMDkMcD
kMDckM
a
γ
    (A6) 
 
where: 
•  ccckVkM r −+−−≡ 2)1)()(()(1 γγ , 
•  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++≡ 2)(
cD
Tc
TDM γ , 
•  
Tc
TTckMkM
c
)1(
))((
)( 212 γ
γ
−+
++≡ ,  
• TckMkM γ++≡ )()( 13 . 
This solution holds ad long as 2/)0(
)0(
cV
cV
−
−<γ . From equation (A6) we can draw some insights 
on the relationship between debt D and the regulated wholesale (and indirectly retail) charge: as 
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long as the debt level is relatively low, i.e. )(1 kMD ≤ , then the social optimal access charge is not 
affected by D. As long as the debt increases, the regulator decides to raise the wholesale charge in 
order to avoid financial distress, and so we have that a = D + c. However, this happens up to a limit, 
since an excessively high access charge affects negatively the consumer surplus. Therefore, as long 
as debt increases, i.e. in the range )()( 32 kMDkM ≤< , the regulator no longer finds optimal to 
increase the access charge with D on a 1:1 basis since it affects consumer surplus too much. Finally, 
when debt is too large ( )(3 kMD > ), the probability of financial distress is 1. Since bankruptcy is 
now inevitable, there is no reason to incorporate any longer the debt in the access charge and 
therefore the regulated access charge is constant with D but it is affected by the cost of financial 
distress T. 
It is immediate to see that the regulated access charge is positively affected by the debt level, 
D, as long as leverage is within some threshold level. Therefore, it results that 0* >∂
∂
D
a ; this 
represents our first testable prediction. Since the regulated retail tariff is equal to rcap += , then 
also p is affected by D. Therefore, we can derive the second testable prediction as follows: 0>∂
∂
D
p . 
Moreover, notice that the quantity sold by alternative operators depends on the marginal cost they 
face, i.e. ))(( rE capQ + . Therefore, since 0* >∂
∂
D
a , 0
*
>∂
∂
a
p  and 0<∂
∂
p
QE , then it results that the 
higher is the access charge the lower the unit sold by alternative operators since their marginal costs 
increases, while the marginal cost of the vertically integrated incumbent (c + cr) does not change. 
Hence, since debt affects the regulated access charge, it in turn also impacts negatively on the 
degree of market competition, strengthening the market position of the incumbent but softening the 
alternative operators’ one (i.e. 0<∂
∂
D
QE ). This is our third prediction to test. Finally, it is important 
to define the relationship between debt and investment. On this point, our model mimics the model 
by Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Spiegel (1994): they find that the investment level is always 
below the social optimal level, meaning that the regulated firm still underinvests. In other word, 
debt can be used as a commitment device to limit the regulator ex post opportunism and so 
strengthen the incentive to invest ex ante. Therefore, even though in their model k and D are 
simultaneously set by the firm, we should expect a positive relationship between investment and 
debt, i.e.  0>∂
∂
D
k . 
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APPENDIX A2 – VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variable Definitions      
  
Investment Rate  Gross fixed investment/Capital Stock at replacement value  
Leverage (Short and long term financial debt)/(Book Equity+ST+LT financial debt)
Debt-to-sales (Short and long term financial debt)/(Sales) 
Debt-to-total assets (Short and long term financial debt)/(Total Assets) 
Total Assets (log) Log of real total assets 
Real sales (log) Log of real sales 
Tangibility Net fixed assets/ Total Assets 
Labour productivity Real sales/Number of employees 
EBIT-to-Asset  Earnings before interests and taxes/total assets 
Market-to Book (Equity) Market value of the Equity)/Book value of the Equity  
  
 
 
APPENDIX A3 - SAMPLE FIRMS 
 
Company Name Country Sample Period 
Privately 
Controlled 
Since 
   
Telekom Austria AG Austria 1998 – 2005 2000 
Belgacom SA Belgium 1994 – 2005 ------ 
TeleDanmark AS Denmark 1994 – 2005 1998 
Sonera Finland 1997 – 2002 1997 
France Telecom France 1994 – 2005 2004 
Deutsche Telekom AG Germany 1994 – 2005 ------ 
OTE (Hellenic Telecom Organization) Greece 1994 – 2005 2002 
EIRCOM Ireland 1999 – 2005 1999 
Telecom Italia SpA Italy 1994 – 2005 1997 
Koninklijke KPN NV Netherlands 1994 – 2005 1994 
Portugal Telecom SA Portugal 1994 – 2005 1997 
Telefonica de Espana SA Spain 1994 – 2005 1994 
Telia AB Sweden 1997 – 2005 ------ 
British Telecommunications PLC UK 1994 – 2005 1994 
Kingston Communications UK 1998 – 2005 2000 
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